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1 Introduction
Before most individual or collective decisions, concerned parties can communicate with each
other and exchange information. The availability of communication may influence outcomes in
important ways. This simple observation has given rise to a rich literature in game theory that
aims at characterizing achievable equilibrium outcomes in strategic decision problems extended
with communication (see, e.g., Myerson, 1994). In this paper, we adopt a different approach
and try to understand when pre-play communication leads to full disclosure of privately held
information, under the assumption that the players can make certifiable statements (i.e., the
availability of messages depends on types).1 We consider general Bayesian games augmented
by a communication stage at which players can publicly disclose information about their type
before choosing their actions in a second stage.
In order to enforce full disclosure, players must be able to coordinate on second stage
actions that deter any unilateral attempt to conceal information at the communication stage.
To understand when this is possible, we define the masquerade relation, which is a simple
description of the incentives of a player with given private information (or type) to pretend
that her information is different (i.e., to masquerade as another type). This relation is easy to
build. If, in the communication phase, each player fully reveals her type, the game played at the
action stage is a complete information game that depends on the type profile. Hence, in a fully
revealing equilibrium, each player expects to get the payoff associated with the equilibrium2
of the complete information game that unfolds. If a player could convince all the others that
her type is different from the truth, she might benefit by following up on her lie and best-
responding to the misguided equilibrium that the other players coordinate on. If she benefits
from masquerading as a certain target type, we say that her true type wants to masquerade as
the targeted type. The masquerade relation is best represented as a directed graph on the type
set of a player, such that an arrow points from one type to another whenever the former wants
1The assumption of certifiable information has been introduced in sender-receiver games by Grossman (1981)
and Milgrom (1981). It is also used in a branch of the mechanism design and implementation literature (see,
e.g., Green and Laffont, 1986, Bull and Watson, 2004, 2007, Deneckere and Severinov, 2008, Sher and Vohra,
2011, Ben-Porath and Lipman, 2012, Kartik and Tercieux, 2012).
2Uniqueness is assumed only in the introduction in order to simplify the exposition.
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to masquerade as the latter.
This summary of a player’s incentives suggests a natural way to deter obfuscation at the
communication stage. To support a fully revealing equilibrium, we must ensure that, for any
player and any possible message from this player, other players can attribute this message to
a worst case type, that is, a type that none of the other types who could have possibly sent
this message wants to masquerade as. This idea of assigning a worst case type to any message
captures the idea of Milgrom (1981) that, in order to enforce full information revelation, the
players should exercise skepticism. Thus, our analysis provides a simple operational definition
of what it means to be skeptical: it consists in interpreting any message as coming from a
minimal element of the masquerade relation. Whenever the masquerade relation is acyclic,
these worst case types are sure to exist. The best-known examples of the literature have
a monotonicity property that makes it easy to identify minimal elements, but our approach
provides a systematic way of evaluating more general models.
Our first main result characterizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of a fully revealing sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) when we restrict players
to hold extremal beliefs off the equilibrium path, that is, beliefs that put probability 1 on a
single type of a deviating player.3 We say that the communication game admits an evidence
base if every type of a player has access to a distinct message that certifies a set of types for
which it is a worst case type.4 We show that there exists a fully revealing sequential equilibrium
with extremal beliefs if and only if the communication game admits an evidence base and every
certifiable subset of types admits a worst case type.
Most of our results rely on this general characterization and on the following simple obser-
vation: the existence of a worst case type for every subset of types of a player is equivalent
to the acyclicity of her masquerade relation, which, in turn, is equivalent to the existence of a
3More precisely, when a player unilaterally deviates from full disclosure during the communication phase,
we restrict our attention to beliefs such that every non-deviating player attributes the deviant message to a
single type among its possible senders. We show that this restriction, combined with full support and strong
belief consistency (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), imposes that the beliefs about the deviator are common to all
non-deviators and do not depend on their types.
4This includes any situation in which players can certify their true type.
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function that weakly represents the masquerade relation of the player.5 For the class of games
satisfying this property, there exists a fully revealing equilibrium (with any beliefs off path) if
and only if there exists an evidence base for each player. While apparently quite theoretical,
this characterization is extremely useful to pin down sufficient conditions for the existence of
a fully revealing equilibrium in large classes of games and economic applications. The first of
these conditions is monotonicity. If the masquerading payoff of a player is increasing in the
type she masquerades as, the acyclicity condition is clearly satisfied. This is the case in the
seller-buyer models of Milgrom (1981) and Grossman (1981), where a seller always prefers to
appear as having a higher quality product. Most of the literature has followed in these steps by
relying on a monotonicity condition in more complicated games (see Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990
and Van Zandt and Vives, 2007). A notable exception is Giovannoni and Seidmann (2007),
in which full revelation relies on a combination of two conditions6: single-peakedness of the
masquerading payoff in the target type, and (in our terminology) a no reciprocal masquerade
condition ensuring that no two types want to masquerade as each other. We provide a simple
and more general approach by showing that these two conditions prevent the existence of cycles
in the masquerade relation.
In many interesting games and economic problems, the single-peakedness or the monotonic-
ity conditions are not satisfied. For instance, they are not satisfied in coordination games in
which each player wants to be close to her ideal action and to the actions of other players, in
games of influence in which each player wants to convince all others to choose her own ideal
action, or in voting games such as the jury model with a non-unanimous voting rule. We show
that the acyclic masquerade property holds whenever the masquerading payoff has single cross-
ing differences7; that is, if the return from masquerading as a higher type is positive for a given
true type, then it is also positive for higher true types.
To illustrate our approach, we provide new applied results that contribute to different liter-
atures. Our first application considers supermodular Bayesian games with complementarities
5The function wi weakly represents the masquerade relation of player i iff, whenever type ti of player i wants
to masquerade as type si, we have wi(si) > wi(ti).
6The conditions in Seidmann and Winter (1997) also imply these two conditions.
7Or, therefore, increasing differences. The terminology adopted is that of Milgrom (2004).
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between own actions and all types (as in Van Zandt and Vives, 2007). We show that if the
preferences of the players also exhibit complementarities in own type and the actions of other
players, then the masquerading payoffs have increasing differences and there exists a fully re-
vealing equilibrium.8 Our second application contributes to the literature on deliberation before
voting9 by considering a general voting game that includes the jury model. This model can be
applied to voting in a parliament, for example, and has both voters and experts that testify in
front of the voters. The experts could have evidence about the virtues of a proposal, and the
members of the parliament may have evidence about how it would affect their constituency,
for example. The voters choose between two alternatives such that, for each player, the differ-
ence in payoff between the alternatives is non-decreasing in the types of all players. We show
that the ex post masquerading payoffs satisfy increasing differences for each player under every
non-unanimous voting rule, so that there is a fully revealing equilibrium of the voting game
preceded by a debate.10 The case of unanimity is even simpler since the masquerade relations
of the voters then satisfy the monotonicity condition.
The sufficient conditions used above are especially suited for incomplete information games
in which each player’s type set is unidimensional. But the acyclic property and the weak
representation of the masquerade relation can also be used to analyze information revelation
in games with multidimensional types. In particular, we prove existence of a fully revealing
equilibrium in lobbying or conformity games with multidimensional types and actions and in
which the masquerade relation of a player can be written as the sum of two terms: a first
one maximized when the sender masquerades as her true type; a second one proportional to a
function of the type that she masquerades as. We also study sender-receiver games where the
sender has a multidimensional and type-dependent bias. In such games, for every type of the
sender, the bias vector points to the direction toward which this expert wants to masquerade
8This result is different from the result of Van Zandt and Vives (2007), which says that if the actions of
others have positive or negative externalities, then there exists a fully revealing equilibrium.
9See, for example, Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006), Gerardi and Yariv (2007), Jackson and Tan (2013),
Lizzeri and Yariv (2011), Mathis (2011).
10In the main body of the paper, we prove this result under type independence. In the online appendix,
we show that it holds regardless of the type distribution provided that we consider weak sequential equilibria
instead of strong sequential equilibria.
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as. We provide a sufficient condition on the bias function to induce acyclic masquerades. This
includes cases in which the bias function is centrifugal (the sender wants to pretend she is
further away from a central type than she really is) or mildly centripetal (the sender wants to
pretend she is closer to a central type than she really is).
2 The Model
The Base Game. There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of players who are to interact in a base
game with action set11 A = A1 × · · · × An. Each player i is privately informed about her type
ti ∈ Ti, where Ti is a finite set or a subset of RK , and T = T1 × · · · × Tn is the set of type
profiles endowed with its natural topology. Let p(·) ∈ ∆(T ) be a full support common prior
probability distribution over type profiles, and p(·|ti) ∈ ∆(T−i) the interim belief of player i
when she is of type ti.
12 The preferences of the players are given by von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions ui : A× T → R.
Let Γ =
〈
N, T,A, p, (ui)i∈N
〉
denote this Bayesian game. To every type profile t ∈ T , we
can associate the complete information normal form game Γ˜(t) =
〈
N,A, (ui(·, t))i∈N
〉
. To avoid
introducing additional conditions on Γ˜(t), we make the following assumption throughout the
paper:
Assumption 1. For every type profile t ∈ T , the best-reply correspondence of the game Γ˜(t) is
well defined, and the set of Nash equilibria of Γ˜(t), denoted by NE(t) ⊆ A, is nonempty.
The Communication Phase. Before choosing their actions in A, but after learning their
types, the players have the opportunity to publicly and simultaneously disclose hard evidence
about their type at no cost. To formalize this, suppose that player i is restricted to send
messages in a finite set Mi(ti) if her type is ti. Let Mi =
⋃
ti∈TiMi(ti) be the set of possible
messages of player i, and M = M1 × · · · ×Mn the message space. Then a message mi ∈ Mi
11This formulation does not exclude mixed strategy equilibria since each Ai can be replaced by the set of
mixed actions ∆(Ai) and the utility functions could be extended to mixed actions in the usual way.
12We assume a common prior, but the solution concept and our results can be readily extended to games
with heterogeneous prior beliefs pi(·) ∈ ∆(T ) as long as pi(·|ti) ∈ ∆(T−i) has full support for every i ∈ N and
ti ∈ Ti.
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provides evidence to other players that i’s type is in M−1i (mi) := {ti ∈ Ti : mi ∈ Mi(ti)}. A
subset Si of Ti is certifiable if there exists a message mi ∈ Mi such that M−1i (mi) = Si. We
assume that all certifiable sets are compact subsets of Ti. The message structure satisfies own
type certifiability, if for every player i, every singleton {ti} is certifiable.
Fully Revealing Equilibria Our equilibrium concept is the notion of sequential equilibrium
of Kreps and Wilson (1982). It is defined as a profile of strategies and a belief system satisfying
strong belief consistency and sequential rationality at every information set. A pair of a strategy
profile and a belief system is strongly consistent if it can be obtained as the limit of a completely
mixed strategy profile and of the corresponding belief system obtained by Bayesian updating.13
In the rest of the paper, the term equilibrium refers to this definition.14
We are interested in equilibria of the augmented game in which all players perfectly reveal
their type in the communication phase—henceforth, fully revealing equilibria. In a fully reveal-
ing equilibrium, the second stage game on the equilibrium path corresponds to the complete
information game Γ˜(t), and therefore the action profile played on the equilibrium path must
be in NE(t). We choose a selection a∗(t) from NE(t) and reformulate our objective as finding
conditions under which there exists a fully revealing equilibrium of the augmented game such
that a∗(t) is played on the equilibrium path.
The Masquerade. As Seidmann and Winter (1997) already noticed in the sender-receiver
case, the key to discouraging obfuscation is to attribute any message mi to a type si in the set
M−1i (mi) of its possible senders such that none of the other types in M
−1
i (mi) would like to
masquerade as si. This naturally leads us to investigate when a type ti would like to masquerade
13The notion of strong belief consistency in Kreps and Wilson (1982) is only defined for extensive form games
with finite information sets; in general, it is hard to appropriately define sequential equilibria in infinite games
(see Myerson and Reny, 2013); hence, when the type sets are not finite, we simply adopt the same restrictions
on beliefs as those imposed by strong consistency in the finite case (see Lemma 1).
14In the web appendix, we also consider weak sequential equilibria in the sense of Myerson (1991) to obtain
additional results. They are equilibria that satisfy sequential rationality and weak belief consistency, where weak
consistency here means Bayesian consistency on the equilibrium path and off-path beliefs that are consistent
with evidence.
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as another type si. For this purpose, let
vi(ti|ti) = Et−i
(
ui
(
a∗(t), t
) | ti)
denote the expected utility of player i on the equilibrium path of a fully revealing equilibrium
if she is of type ti, and
vi(si|ti) = Et−i
(
ui
(
BRi(a
∗
−i(si, t−i), t), a
∗
−i(si, t−i), t
) | ti),
the utility that she would obtain by masquerading as si. In the remainder of the paper, the
following notation for the utility in the expectation will be useful:
vi(si|ti; t−i) = ui
(
BRi(a
∗
−i(si, t−i), t), a
∗
−i(si, t−i), t
)
.
We call vi(si|ti) and vi(si|ti; t−i) the interim and ex post masquerading payoff functions. We will
assume the following continuity property of vi(si|ti). This assumption is automatically satisfied
when Ti is finite. It is not innocuous, but often satisfied in commonly studied situations.
Together with the assumptions of compactness of the certifiable subsets made above, it allows
us to extend the results that hold for finite type sets to infinite type sets.15
Assumption 2 (Semicontinuity). For every player i, the function vi(si|ti) is lower semi-
continuous in si.
We can define a binary relation
M−→ on Ti, the masquerade relation, that summarizes the
incentives of different types to masquerade as one another.
Definition 1 (Masquerade). We say that ti wants to masquerade as si, denoted by ti
M−→ si,
whenever vi(si|ti) > vi(ti|ti).
This relation is, by definition, irreflexive (ti
M−→ si ⇒ ti 6= si), but generally not transitive.
We can use this relation to define a worst case type for Si ⊆ Ti as a type in Si that no other
15We recall that vi(si|ti) is lower semi-continuous in si if, for every α ∈ R, the set {si ∈ Ti | vi(si|ti) > α} is
open.
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S ′i
wct(S ′i)
Si
wct(Si) = ∅
Figure 1: Masquerade relation and worst case types.
type in Si would like to masquerade as:
wct(Si) :=
{
si ∈ Si | @ ti ∈ Si, ti M−→ si
}
.
This set may be empty, or have more than one element. It is useful to represent the masquerade
relation by a directed graph on Ti, as illustrated in Figure 1. A worst case type for Si is an
element si ∈ Si with no incoming arrow from other elements of Si.
Evidence Base. An evidence base is a set of messages that a player can use to certify each
of her possible types.
Definition 2 (Evidence Base). An evidence base for player i is a set of messages Ei ⊆ Mi
such that there exists a one-to-one function ei : Ti → Ei that satisfies ei(ti) ∈ Mi(ti) and
ti ∈ wct
(
M−1i
(
ei(ti)
))
for every ti.
Equivalently, an evidence base allocates to each type ti of player i a message ei(ti) that
certifies a set in which no type of player i would like to masquerade as ti, that is, M
−1
i (ei(ti)) ⊆
{si ∈ Ti : si 6M−→ ti} for every ti ∈ Ti. Note that when own type certifiability holds, any collection
of messages certifying the singletons {ti} for ti ∈ Ti forms an evidence base, regardless of the
masquerade relation. The set of evidence bases, however, depends on the masquerade relation.
For example, if Ti can be linearly ordered such that the masquerade is monotonic (i.e., ti
M−→ t′i
for every t′i higher than ti), as in Milgrom (1981) or Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990), then there
is an evidence base if and only if each type can certify that it belongs to a subset for which her
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true type is minimal: for all ti ∈ Ti, there exists mi ∈ Mi(ti) such that ti = minM−1i (mi). In
common interest games, that is, games in which no type would like to masquerade as any other
type, there is an evidence base if and only if each type can simply send a different message.
As another illustration, consider a player i with three possible types, Ti = {t1, t2, t3}, whose
masquerade relation is given by t1
M−→ t2 M−→ t3. The message correspondence Mi(t1) =
{m,m13,m12}, Mi(t2) = {m,m23,m12}, and Mi(t3) = {m,m23,m13} admits two evidence
bases: {m,m23,m13} and {m12,m23,m13}. In contrast, the message correspondence Mi(t1) =
{m,m12}, Mi(t2) = {m,m2,m23,m12}, and Mi(t3) = {m,m23} does not admit any evidence
base because type t3 has no message certifying an event for which it is a worst case type.16 In
Section 5, we provide more intuitive examples of evidence bases related to our applications.
The existence of an evidence base is important since it is necessary for a fully revealing
equilibrium to exist.17
Remark 1 (Evidence Base: Necessity). If there exists a fully revealing equilibrium, then there
must exist an evidence base Ei for every player i.
Indeed, consider a fully revealing equilibrium communication strategy profile σ that imple-
ments some Nash equilibrium a∗(·) of the contingent complete information games. Then the
sets of messages sent with positive probability by each type ti under σi must be disjoint across
types. Let σˆi(ti) be a selection of one message in the support of σi(ti) for each ti, and suppose
that ti /∈ wct(M−1i (σˆi(ti))). Then there exists a type t′i 6= ti that wants to masquerade as ti and
can send the message σˆi(ti). Since σˆi(ti) is not in the support of σi(t
′
i), this contradicts the fact
that σ is an equilibrium. Therefore, the selection σˆi(·) must form an evidence base for Mi(·).
16These examples also show that the existence of an evidence base is not related to the “nested range condition”
(Green and Laffont, 1986) or the “minimal closure” / “normality” condition (Forges and Koessler, 2005; Bull
and Watson, 2007) used to get a revelation principle with hard evidence.
17Mathis (2008) made the same observation for a class of sender-receiver games.
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3 Characterization of Fully Revealing Equilibria with
Extremal Beliefs
In this section, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a particular
kind of fully revealing equilibrium in which every deviation is attributed to a single type of the
deviator. The first part of the section defines these extremal beliefs equilibria, and discusses the
consequences of the restrictions they place on equilibrium beliefs.
Extremal Beliefs. In order to support a fully revealing equilibrium, players must be able
to punish any player i who sends an off the equilibrium path message mi. The other players
have two levers to punish a deviator: (i) by forming appropriate beliefs about the type of the
deviator subject to the restriction imposed by the hard information contained in mi; (ii) by
coordinating on appropriate sequentially rational actions in the second stage. In order to make
things tractable, we make two restrictions off the equilibrium path: one on beliefs and one on
actions.
First, we restrict off the equilibrium path beliefs after unilateral deviations to be extremal
in the sense that they belong to the extreme points of the simplex ∆(Ti).
Definition 3 (Extremal Beliefs). A fully revealing equilibrium with extremal beliefs is a fully
revealing equilibrium such that, after any unilateral deviation, each player’s beliefs assign prob-
ability 1 to a single type of the deviator.
The second restriction concerns the second stage equilibrium actions that can be played
off the equilibrium path. To understand this restriction, suppose that player i unilaterally
deviates by sending an off the equilibrium path message mi, while every player j 6= i sends
an equilibrium message that reveals her true type tj. Then, under extremal beliefs, all players
must attribute a single type t′i ∈ M−1i (mi) to player i. The extremal beliefs assumption does
not require all players other than i to attribute the same type t′i to player i, but we will show in
the next paragraph that this is required by strong consistency. Consequently, all non-deviators
put probability 1 on the type profile (t′i, t−i). Then, sequential rationality requires that non-
11
deviators play according to some action profile in NE(t′i, t−i) but not necessarily a
∗(t′i, t−i). We
will consider only equilibria in which they do play according to a∗(t′i, t−i).
Definition 4. We say that an equilibrium implements a∗(·) on and off the equilibrium path if,
whenever the second stage beliefs of all non-deviating players put probability 1 on a particular
type profile t, all the non-deviating players play according to a∗(t).
Clearly, this restriction is without loss of generality when the complete information game
Γ˜(t) has a unique equilibrium for every type profile t. It is also a natural assumption when
there is a unique “reasonable” equilibrium of each Γ˜(t). For example, if we consider a voting
game with two alternatives, the unique reasonable equilibrium is one in which all voters vote
for their preferred alternative. It is important to keep in mind that this restriction and the
restriction to extremal beliefs only make it harder to find existence results in the sense that
there may be games for which fully revealing equilibria exist but can only be constructed by
violating our restrictions. We use them because, under these restrictions, the existence of fully
revealing equilibria can be simply characterized by properties of the masquerade relation.
Strong Consistency and Extremal Beliefs. Strong consistency has important implica-
tions for the beliefs that can be held off the equilibrium path in fully revealing equilibria with
extremal beliefs. We show that after any detectable unilateral deviation by player j sending
message mj, the belief formed by other players about the type of player j depends only on mj.
In particular, all non-deviators form the same belief, independently of their type and of the
messages sent by other non-deviators.
Lemma 1 (Consistent Extremal Beliefs). In a fully revealing equilibrium with extremal beliefs,
after any unilateral deviation of some player j in the communication stage, the off-path beliefs
of all players i 6= j assign probability 1 to the same type tj ∈ Tj of player j independently of the
message vector m−j and their own type ti.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This result is interesting and new (to the best of our knowledge), but quite technical. The
intuition is that if the belief µ formed after a unilateral deviation is extremal, it puts probability
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1 on a single type t′j. For µ to be consistent, there must be a sequence of Bayes-consistent beliefs
µk that converges to µ and is generated by a sequence of completely mixed strategies of player
j that put infinitely more weight on mj when she is of type t
′
j than when she is of any other
type t′′j . But if this is the case, the information contained in the strategy of player j crowds out
any information about j contained in the prior, and, in particular, any information that the
non-deviators could derive from the correlation between tj and their own type, or what they
deduce on the types of other non-deviators from their messages.18
The Characterization. The existence of evidence bases for each player is necessary for the
existence of a fully revealing equilibrium and it can be interpreted as a richness condition on
the language saying that all private information can be credibly conveyed. Worst case types are
important because they allow to discourage unilateral deviations to messages off the equilibrium
path. In fact, Lemma 1 implies that, with extremal beliefs, the deviating message mj must be
attributed to a single type tj ∈M−1j (mj) that depends only on which message was sent. If this
type is not a worst case type of M−1j (mj), then there must exist another type in M
−1
j (mj) that
gets a higher payoff by sending mj than in a fully revealing equilibrium.
These two conditions are also sufficient, as we show in the following theorem. It is not
difficult to construct a fully revealing equilibrium when they are satisfied: the messages from
the evidence base should be used on the equilibrium path for the players to reveal their type, and
detectable deviations should be attributed to worst case types. The difficulty of the proof is to
show that the equilibrium we just constructed satisfies the strong belief consistency requirement.
Theorem 1 (Characterization). There exists a fully revealing equilibrium with extremal beliefs
that implements a∗(·) on and off the equilibrium path if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied for every i:
(i) For every mi ∈Mi, the set M−1i (mi) admits a worst case type.
18Note that the full support assumption is fundamental for this property to hold. The restriction imposed
by the sequential equilibrium in the lemma also follows from the “strategic independence principle” (Battigalli,
1996), and it is explicitly required under the “no-signaling-what-you-don’t-know” condition in Fudenberg and
Tirole’s (1991) definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium when types are independently distributed.
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(ii) The correspondence Mi(·) admits an evidence base.
Proof. See Appendix B.
To conclude this section, we provide two examples. The first one illustrates Theorem 1
and shows how adding messages can destroy the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium with
extremal beliefs.
Example 1. Consider a sender-receiver game in which the sender’s type set is given by T =
{t1, t2, t3, t4}; the masquerade relation and the certifiable subsets are given in Figure 2. By
Theorem 1, there exists a fully revealing equilibrium with extremal beliefs. If we add a new
message m5 that certifies {t2, t3, t4}, this is no longer true. 
t1 t2 t4
t3
m2 m3
m4
m1
Figure 2: An example
Our next example shows that the existence of worst case types is not necessary if interior
beliefs are allowed off the equilibrium path.
Example 2 (Hidden Bias). Consider a sender-receiver problem in which the receiver can decide
between two policies A and B, or keep the status quo φ. The sender can have information
favorable to either of the policies A and B, and also has a bias which is unknown to the
receiver. We denote the types of the sender by T = {aA, aB, bA, bB}, where type aB is biased
toward A, and has receiver information favorable to B. We assume that all types are equally
probable. The payoff matrix is given in the following table where the payoff of the sender
appears first and the payoff of the receiver second.
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A B φ
aA 1, 1 −1,−1 sφ, rφ
aB 1,−1 −1, 1 sφ, rφ
bA −1, 1 1,−1 sφ, rφ
bB −1,−1 1, 1 sφ, rφ
Table 1: Hidden bias – with sφ, rφ < 1.
The corresponding masquerade relation is represented in Figure 3. The sender can disclose
her information A or B, or not disclose anything, so the certifiable sets are as represented on the
figure. We assume that cheap talk is possible, which means that there are several messages that
certify the same subset (at least as many as there are types in the corresponding certifiable
subset). We denote a generic message that certifies the complete set as m0, and a generic
message that certifies information favorable to policy X as mX .
aA aB
bA bB
mA mB m0
Figure 3: Hidden bias.
There exists an evidence base so full revelation is possible. Indeed, since cheap talk is
allowed, there exist two messages mA and m
′
A that certify A, and that can be used respectively
by aA and bA since they are both worst case types of the set {aA, bA}, and the same is true
for bB and aB with two messages mB and m
′
B that certify B.
However, the type set, which is certifiable by m0, admits no worst case type, hence there is
no fully revealing equilibrium with extremal beliefs. We will first show that a fully revealing
equilibrium may nevertheless exist, depending on the values of sφ and rφ. Next, in case no
fully revealing equilibrium exists, we will characterize the receiver’s optimal partially revealing
equilibrium.
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Suppose that there exists a fully revealing equilibrium, and consider a message m0 that
certifies T . This message must be off the equilibrium path since it has no worst case type.
Also, it cannot be the case that the receiver responds to this message by mixing between A
and B, for that would give a higher payoff than the full revelation payoff to either bA or aB.
So it must be the case that the receiver chooses the status quo φ to respond to this message.
There exists a belief that justifies the choice of the status quo by the receiver if and only if
rφ ≥ 0. It must also be the case that the choice of the status quo induces the sender to choose
to reveal the truth rather than sending a message that reveals nothing. This is true if and only
if sφ < −1. In summary, a necessary condition for the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium
is that the receiver prefers the status quo to choosing randomly between the two policies, and
that the sender always prefers her least favored policy to the status quo. It is easy to show that
this condition is also sufficient by fixing the belief that follows any message m0 to the one that
puts equal weight on A and B.
Now suppose that rφ < 0 or sφ > −1. Then either the receiver never chooses the status
quo regardless of her information, or the status quo is not an effective punishment and does
not induce revelation from aB and bA. Then the best achievable situation from the point of
view of the receiver is to be able to identify the types aA and bB. This is done by following
each message m0 by a belief that puts the same probability on aB and on bA, and choosing the
status quo if rφ ≥ 0 and any mixing between A and B otherwise. 
4 Acyclic Masquerade
In this section, we define a class of games for which a worst case type exists for every subset of
types. Therefore, the existence of fully revealing equilibria for this class of game is characterized
by the existence of an evidence base for each player.
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4.1 Definition and Characterization
We say that a game Γ with a selection a∗(·) has the acyclic masquerade property if, for every
player i, the masquerade relation on Ti is acyclic. The following proposition characterizes
acyclic masquerade relations.19
Proposition 1. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The masquerade relation of player i is acyclic.
(ii) Every finite subset Si ⊆ Ti admits a worst case type.
(iii) There exists a lower semi-continuous function wi : Ti → R such that
ti
M−→ si ⇒ wi(si) > wi(ti). (WR)
(iv) There exists a complete, transitive, and lower semi-continuous order  on Ti, such that
ti
M−→ si ⇒ si  ti. (DM)
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the proposition, (DM) stands for Directional Masquerade. It says that there is an order
such that all types only want to masquerade as types that are their successors in this order.
(WR) stands for Weak Representation, a term borrowed from the literature on the represen-
tation of binary relations. Condition (ii) means that we can find a worst case type on every
subset of Ti in the finite case. In the infinite case, we would like to have a similar property.
Since the only subsets on which we need worst case types are the certifiable ones, which we
restricted to be compact subsets, it is sufficient to show that we can find worst case types on
every compact subset of Ti. To see that, we just need to notice that the worst case types of
19An order  on Ti is lower semi-continuous if, for every ti, the set {si ∈ Ti | si  ti} is open. It is complete
if, for every si and ti in Ti, either si  ti or ti  si, and transitive if ti  t′i and t′i  t′′i implies that ti  t′′i .
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a certifiable subset Si are exactly the minimizers of the weak representation wi(·), which exist
since the function is lower semi-continuous.
Lemma 2. The acyclic masquerade property implies that, for every i, every compact subset Si
of Ti admits a worst case type.
From Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, we can immediately deduce that, in the class of games with
the acyclic masquerade property, the existence of an evidence base for each player is a sufficient
condition for the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium. From Remark 1, we know that it is
also necessary.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the acyclic masquerade property is satisfied. Then there exists a
fully revealing equilibrium that implements a∗(·) if and only if there exists an evidence base for
every player i.
We can directly apply Proposition 1 to the case in which the masquerading payoffs of
informed players are independent of their type. For instance, this is true in the seller-buyer
example of Milgrom (1981) and in the multidimensional cheap talk model of Chakraborty and
Harbaugh (2010). In this case, we can represent the masquerade relation by the function
wi(si) = vi(si|ti), which leads to the following remark.
Remark 2. Suppose that the interim masquerading payoff of each player is independent of her
type. Then the acyclic masquerade property is satisfied.
We showed in Example 1 that adding messages could destroy full revelation. This is no
longer true for games that satisfy the acyclic masquerade property. This is just because evidence
bases are preserved under the addition of new messages, and the new certifiable subsets that
are created must admit worst case types by the acyclic masquerade property.
4.2 Sufficient Conditions on Masquerading Payoffs
The following theorem provides a list of sufficient conditions for the masquerade relation to be
acyclic. (MON) stands for Monotonicity, (ID) and (SCD) stand for Increasing Differences and
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Single Crossing Differences. (SP-NRM) is a set of two conditions, Single Peakedness and No
Reciprocal Masquerade. For a reminder of standard definitions used in the statement of this
theorem, see Appendix A.
Theorem 2 (Sufficient Conditions). The acyclic masquerade property is satisfied whenever, for
every i, there exists a linear order  on Ti such that any of the following conditions is satisfied:
(MON) vi(si|ti) is non-decreasing in si.
(ID) vi(si|ti) has increasing differences in (si, ti).
(SCD) vi(si|ti) has single crossing differences in (si, ti).
(SP-NRM) vi(si|ti) is single-peaked in si and satisfies the following no reciprocal masquerade
condition:
vi(si|ti) > vi(ti|ti) ⇒ vi(si|si) ≥ vi(ti|si).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Most of the literature on disclosure of hard information is based on (MON). When it is
satisfied, every type would like to masquerade as the highest possible type. This is the case in
the seller-buyer models of Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981). The seller’s payoff is increasing
in the perceived quality of her product. Then the buyer can interpret every announcement of
the seller skeptically as coming from the lowest quality seller consistent with the announcement.
This skeptical behavior leads to full revelation. Another typical example mentioned in Okuno-
Fujiwara et al. (1990) is a linear Cournot game with homogeneous goods and privately known
marginal costs, in which the equilibrium payoff of a firm decreases when its competitors form
higher beliefs about its cost.
The sender-receiver game of Crawford and Sobel (1982) does not satisfy the (MON) property,
but it satisfies (DM) because the sign of the difference between the ideal actions of the sender
and the receiver is independent of the sender’s type. If the sender’s ideal action is, say, always
higher than the receiver’s, the sender only wants to masquerade as a higher type. This does not
19
mean, however, that she wants to masquerade as any higher type. In this case, it is easy to see
that (DM) is satisfied for the natural order on types. In general, however, it may be difficult
to find an order under which (DM) holds.20
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to show that (SCD) and (ID) are sufficient conditions
for the existence of fully revealing equilibria. When (ID) holds, the return of masquerading as
a higher type increases with one’s true type. When (SCD) holds, if the return of masquerading
as a higher type is positive for ti, then it is also positive for t
′
i  ti. The condition (SP-NRM) is
used in Giovannoni and Seidmann (2007) to show the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium
in a sender-receiver model.21
To prove Theorem 2, we show that each condition implies that the masquerade relation
is acyclic. It leaves the question of identifying the worst case types open. It is easy when
(MON) or (DM) hold since, in any subset of types Si, the lowest type is a worst case type. In
Appendix C, Proposition 6 shows how to find worst case types under (SCD) and (SP-NRM).
Ex Post Masquerade and Aggregation. In applications, it is often easier to work with
the ex post masquerading payoffs. Then we can use aggregation results to show that the acyclic
masquerade property is satisfied. In the following lemma, we recall some simple aggregation
results that are useful for the applications.22
Lemma 3 (Ex Post Sufficient Conditions). The acyclic masquerade property is satisfied when-
ever, for every i, there exists a linear order  on Ti such that any of the following conditions
holds:
(i) vi(si|ti; t−i) is non-decreasing in si.
(ii) vi(si|ti; t−i) satisfies ex post directional masquerade: vi(si|ti; t−i) > vi(ti|ti; t−i)⇒ si  ti.
(iii) vi(si|ti; t−i) has increasing differences in (si, ti) and types are independent.
20In particular, the order on types for which (SCD) or (ID) holds may differ from the order induced by (DM).
21In an earlier paper, Seidmann and Winter (1997) also considered sender-receiver games with a slightly
different set of conditions. When the ideal action of the receiver is strictly increasing their existence result is
also a direct corollary of Theorem 2 based on the (SP-NRM) condition.
22For more advanced aggregation results, we refer the reader to Quah and Strulovici (2012).
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Proof. See Appendix B.
Ex post monotonicity and ex post directional masquerade respectively imply monotonicity
and directional masquerade regardless of the information structure. The increasing differences
property of the ex post masquerading payoffs can also be aggregated when types are indepen-
dent. By contrast, the single-peakedness and single crossing properties are often difficult to
aggregate. In the online appendix, we show that it is possible to avoid aggregation issues and
work directly on the ex post masquerade relation to construct fully revealing weak sequential
equilibria.23 The advantage of weak sequential equilibrium is that it does not require beliefs
off the equilibrium path to satisfy the no-conditioning property implied by Lemma 1. That
is, for any unilateral and observable deviation of player i from full revelation, other players
can attribute an ex post worst case type to the message of the deviator (i.e., a belief that is
conditional on t−i). An ex post worst case type exists whenever any of the sufficient conditions
of Theorem 2 holds for the ex post masquerading payoffs instead of the interim masquerading
payoffs.
5 Applications
In this section, we use our general results on the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium in
a variety of economic applications. Some of the proofs rely on increasing differences of the ex
post masquerading payoffs, so for these results we need to assume that types are independently
distributed. As pointed out at the end of the last section, if we weaken the belief consistency
requirement, then all our results hold regardless of the information structure (see the online
appendix).
5.1 Supermodular Games
Suppose that each (Ti,) is a linearly ordered set, and each (Ai,) is a complete lattice. We
say that the base Bayesian game is supermodular if each associated complete information game
23In the sense of, for example, Myerson (1991); it corresponds to what is usually called a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in the literature.
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Γ˜(t) is a supermodular game in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990),
and the utilities exhibit complementarities in types and own actions. The following definition
recalls these assumptions, which are identical to those of Van Zandt and Vives (2007) in their
study of Bayesian games of strategic complementarities.
Definition 5. We say that the (Bayesian) base game Γ =
〈
N, T,A, p, (ui)i∈N
〉
is supermodular
if each ui(a, t) is supermodular in ai, has increasing differences in (ai, a−i) (strategic comple-
mentarities), and has increasing differences in (ai, t) (complementarities between own actions
and type profiles).
It is well known24 that, in this case, NE(t) is a complete lattice, and that its extremal
elements are non-decreasing in t. Let a∗(·) be either the highest equilibrium selection or the
lowest equilibrium selection. If we assume, as in Van Zandt and Vives (2007), that ui(ai, a−i, t)
is non-decreasing or non-increasing in a−i (positive or negative externalities), then it is imme-
diate to show that the ex post masquerading payoffs are monotonic, and therefore the acyclic
masquerade property is satisfied.
If, instead, we try to use single crossing differences, we can obtain a new result on super-
modular games. To do so, we need to make additional regularity assumptions. Thus, in the
remainder of this subsection, we assume that each Ai is a finite product of closed intervals of the
real line with the natural lattice order, and each Ti is a subset of a real interval Θi. We assume
that the utility functions ui(·) are defined on A×Θ, where Θ = Θ1×· · ·×Θn, and that they are
continuously differentiable. Finally, we assume that every equilibrium action a∗i (t), and every
best-response BRi
(
a∗−i(si, t−i)|ti; t−i
)
is interior. Altogether, these assumptions ensure that the
best-responses BRi
(
a∗−i(si, t−i)|ti; t−i
)
always satisfy a first order condition, so that the deriva-
tives of the ex post masquerading payoff vi(si|ti; t−i) can be obtained by the envelope theorem.
Then, the only additional assumption needed to ensure that the ex post masquerading payoff
has increasing differences is that the utilities of the players have increasing differences in their
own type and the actions of the others.
24See Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990).
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Proposition 2 (Supermodular Games). Assume that the base game Γ is supermodular, that
the utility functions are continuously differentiable on A × Θ, and that every best-response
BRi
(
a∗−i(si, t−i)|ti; t−i
)
is interior. Let a∗(·) be either the highest equilibrium selection or the
lowest equilibrium selection. Then, the acyclic masquerade property is satisfied whenever types
are independent and ui(ai, a−i, t) has increasing differences in (a−i, ti).
Proof. See Appendix B.
An immediate corollary of this result is obtained if we replace the condition in Proposition 2
by a separability condition between own type and others’ actions.
Corollary 2. The acyclic masquerade property is satisfied whenever every best-response is
interior and the following set of assumptions is satisfied:
(i) Types are independent.
(ii) For every i, there exist functions gij(·) and hi(·) such that
ui(ai, a−i, t) =
∑
j∈N
gij(aj, t) + hi(ai, a−i, t−i),
where hi(·) has increasing differences in (ai, a−i), gii(·) has increasing differences in (ai, t), and
gij(·), i 6= j, has increasing differences in (aj, ti).
The two following examples are based on recent papers extending Crawford and Sobel
(1982) to multi-player cheap-talk (Hagenbach and Koessler, 2010, Galeotti et al., 2013). Using
Corollary 2, we show that these games satisfy the acyclic masquerade property under fairly
general conditions.
Example 3 (A Coordination Game). Each player has an ideal action θi(t) ∈ R, where Ai = R,
(Ti,) is a linearly ordered set, and θi(·) is non-decreasing. Players also want to coordinate
their own actions with those of other players. Their utilities are given by
ui(a, t) = −αii
(
ai − θi(t)
)2 −∑
j 6=i
αij
(
ai − aj
)2
,
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where the αij are nonnegative coefficients, normalized so that
∑
j αij = 1, and such that
αii > 0.
25 It is easy to apply Corollary 2 to deduce that this game has a fully revealing
equilibrium as long as types are independent and every player has an evidence base. 
Example 4 (An Influence Game). Galeotti et al. (2013) considered a game in which players
try to influence others to play their favorite actions by selectively transmitting information.
We consider a more general payoff and information structure with the restriction that players
communicate hard information. Each player i has an ideal action θi(t) ∈ R. Her final payoff is
given by −∑Nj=1 αij(aj − θi(t))2, with αij ≥ 0; hence she would like all players to play as close
as possible to her own ideal action. Again, if θi(·) is non-decreasing, Corollary 2 applies. 
In a simple version of the two previous examples where players’ biases are constant (θi(t) =
θ(t)+bi), players can be divided into two groups depending on whether their biases are relatively
high or low compared to others’ biases.26 Intuitively, a player with a relatively low (high) bias
would like to appear only as a lower (higher) type than she truly is. Therefore, when other
players skeptically interpret any vague statement of a player as the highest (lowest) type, she
has no interest to deviate from full revelation. In this case, the ex post directional masquerade
condition of Lemma 3 is satisfied, so there is a fully revealing equilibrium whatever the prior
distribution of types. There is an evidence base whenever each player whose bias is relatively
low is able to certify a set of types in which her actual type is maximum, and each player whose
bias is relatively high is able to certify a set of types in which her actual type is minimum. This
intuitive evidence base is easy to exhibit here because the relative bias of a player is independent
of her private information.
25Particular forms of this class of games have been extensively studied in the economic theory of organizations
as, for example, in Alonso et al., 2008 and Rantakari, 2008.
26For example, in the coordination game, when players’ coordination motives are symmetric (αij = α, i 6= j), a
player with a relatively low (high, respectively) bias is simply a player whose bias is smaller (higher, respectively)
than the average bias in the population. Otherwise, see Appendix D for the precise meaning of a “relatively
high/low” bias in the two previous examples.
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5.2 Deliberation with Hard Information
In this subsection, the base game is a voting game in which a proposal may be adopted to
replace the status quo if it is supported by at least q members of the committee. The set
of players is partitioned into the committee, C ⊆ N , whose members can cast a vote in the
election, and other players who are inactive in the election but may disclose information in the
communication phase. Let C be the size of the committee. Without loss of generality, we can
normalize the utility each player derives from the status quo to 0, and we denote by ui the
uncertain payoff she derives from the proposal. Each player i has a private signal ti about the
proposal. We assume that the function Ui(t) = E
(
ui|t1, . . . , tn
)
is non-decreasing in t. This is
the case for example if every player believes the vector (ui, t1, . . . , tn) to be affiliated.
The complete information voting game has multiple equilibria, but only one in weakly
undominated strategies: the sincere voting equilibrium. We can use the tools developed in the
rest of the paper to provide conditions under which there exists a fully revealing equilibrium
that implements the sincere voting equilibrium. We interpret the pre-play communication game
as deliberation with hard evidence. In the complete information voting game, the sincere best-
response of i ∈ C is to vote in favor of the proposal whenever Ui(t) > 0. The acceptance set of
a player is the set of type profiles such that she favors the proposal, Ai = {t ∈ T | Ui(t) > 0}.
Example 5 (The Jury Model). The question of voting with private information and delibera-
tion is often studied within the framework of the jury model. This model is a particular case of
our framework in which the status quo is to acquit and the proposal is to convict. There is a
state of the world ω ∈ {I,G} (innocent or guilty) and the signals of the players are drawn in-
dependently according to a distribution q(ti|ω) that satisfies affiliation. The prior on ω is given
by a probability pi that the defendant is guilty. Each voter has a cost γCi > 0 for unjustified
conviction and γAi > 0 for unjustified acquittal. Then, for this model, we have
Ui(t) = γ
A
i
pi
∏n
i=1 q
(
ti | G
)
pi
∏n
i=1 q
(
ti | G
)
+ (1− pi)∏ni=1 q(ti | I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(G|t)
−γCi
(1− pi)∏ni=1 q(ti | I)
pi
∏n
i=1 q
(
ti | G
)
+ (1− pi)∏ni=1 q(ti | I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(I|t)
,
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which is indeed increasing by affiliation. Then the region A(i) of the type set T over which
voter i favors conviction (the proposal) is characterized by
t ∈ Ai ⇔
n∏
i=1
q(ti|G)
q(ti|I) ≥
(1− pi)γCi
piγAi
,
where the expression on the left-hand side is non-decreasing in t by affiliation. Therefore, we
can order the players according to
(1−pi)γCi
piγAi
, and the sets Ai are non-decreasing in i in the set
containment order A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ An. Hence the acceptance sets of the players are naturally
nested. 
Example 6 (Altruistic Voters). Suppose that the individual expected payoff of player i from
the alternative is given by a non-decreasing function ψi(ti) that only depends on her type,
but that she is altruistic either out of generosity, or because she internalizes the danger of a
revolution if others are too unhappy. She then evaluates the expected value of the alternative
according to the function
Ui(t) = (1− εi)ψi(ti) + εiE
(∑
j 6=i
ψj(tj) | ti
)
,
where εi ∈ [0, 1]. This example also satisfies our assumptions, but in contrast to the jury model,
the players’ acceptance sets are typically not nested. 
Consider now our general model of deliberation before voting, and any rule such that q ≤ C.
For committee members, ex post masquerading payoffs are given by
vi(si|ti; t−i) = Ui(t)1Ui(t)>01Si(si,t−i)≥q−1 + Ui(t)1Ui(t)<01Si(si,t−i)≥q,
where Si(si, t−i) =
∑
j∈Cr{i} 1Uj(si,t−i)>0 is the tally of votes in favor of the alternative among all
voters except i. Under the unanimous rule such that q = C, these payoffs take the simpler form
of vi(si|ti; t−i) = Ui(t)1Ui(t)>01S(si,t−i)≥C−1, which is non-decreasing in si. The monotonicity
property is easy to understand under unanimity, as every voter is in one of two situations ex
post. If, on the one hand, she wants to prevent the proposal from being adopted, then she
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can do so by voting against it, which makes deviation from full revelation pointless. If, on the
other hand, she prefers the proposal, then she only wants to masquerade as a higher type so as
to increase the number of votes in favor of the proposal. Every vague message coming from a
voter can then be skeptically interpreted as coming from the type most favoring the status quo.
For general rules, however, voters’ ex post masquerading payoffs are not monotonic. The
next lemma shows that these payoffs have increasing differences in (si, ti). This is because
masquerading as a higher type induces more agents to vote for the alternative which is more
rewarding for a high true type than for a low one as Ui(t) is non-decreasing in t. The same
holds for agents who do not belong to the committee, and whose masquerading payoff are
vi(si|ti; t−i) = Ui(t)1S(si,t−i)≥q.
Lemma 4. For every i ∈ N , vi(si|ti; t−i) has increasing differences in (si, ti). Under unanimity,
vi(si|ti, t−i) is nondecreasing in si for every i ∈ C.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Then we immediately have the following result.
Proposition 3. Under any voting rule, if types are independent and a∗(·) is the sincere vot-
ing equilibrium, then the acyclic masquerade property is satisfied. If C = N and the rule is
unanimity, then type independence is not needed.
While other results in the voting literature suggest that unanimity may perform less well
than other voting rules in terms of information revelation,27 our results imply that with evidence,
any voting rule can lead to full revelation. While we need independence in Proposition 3, this
result can be extended to any distribution of types if we consider weak sequential equilibria as
in the online appendix. Schulte (2010) showed a similar result for the specific case of the jury
model, and Mathis (2011) extended it to the case in which preferences lead to nested acceptance
27See, for example, Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006). Gerardi and Yariv (2007) showed that when voting
is augmented with a cheap-talk communication stage, all voting rules that differ from unanimous adoption or
unanimous rejection have the same set of equilibria, while the sets obtained under any of the unanimous rules
are subsets of the latter.
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sets. We extend these results by showing that full revelation holds for all preferences that react
to information in the same direction, even when acceptance sets are not nested.
When acceptance sets are nested, the identity of the pivotal voter in the full information
voting game is independent of the realization of t: the pivotal voter i∗ is the one with the
qth largest acceptance set among members of the committee. Clearly, i∗ has no incentive to
masquerade as any other type regardless of her true type. Ex post, other players are either
more opposed to the proposal or more in favor of the proposal than i∗. A voter of the first
kind only ever wants to masquerade as a lower type so as to undermine the proposal, whereas
a voter of the second type only ever wants to masquerade as a higher type. Hence, skeptical
beliefs for any message sent by a player of the first kind consist in interpreting her message as
stemming from a type with the most favorable information for the proposal. Conversely, for
players of the second kind, skepticism consists in believing the information most favorable to
the status quo. So, with nested preferences, the ex post directional masquerade property of
Lemma 3 holds. Furthermore, there is an evidence base for each player whenever the players
who are more favorable to the proposal than the pivotal voter are able to provide any evidence
in favor of it, and the others are able to provide any evidence against it.
5.3 Multidimensional Types
Norms, Lobbies, and Rewards for Masquerading. The Weak Representation approach
can be fruitfully applied to show that communication games with multidimensional types sat-
isfy the acyclic masquerade property. We start with an example inspired from the theory of
conformity of Bernheim (1994). In Bernheim (1994), an agent has a type in R and must perform
an action in R. She wants her action to be as close as possible to her type, but she also wants
other agents to believe that her type is close to a norm. In our version, the type is no longer
one dimensional, and the agent sends hard information about her type instead of performing
an action.
Example 7 (Conformity with Multiple Norms). We consider a sender-receiver model where
T is the type set of the single sender. Here T can be any metric space, but for simplicity let
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T ⊆ RK . There is a single receiver who takes action, but potentially many other agents who
do not take action but form beliefs about the type of the sender. We assume that the optimal
action of the receiver if she knows t is a(t) = t. As in Bernheim (1994), the payoff of the
sender has two components. On the one hand, she would like the receiver to implement the
optimal action a(t). On the other hand, she would like to conform to one of several prevailing
stereotypes in society. To model that second part, suppose that upon convincing other agents
that she is of type s, the sender derives a payoff proportional to −d(s, C), where C ⊆ RK is
a finite set of social stereotypes, and d(s, C) = minc∈C d(s, c) is the Euclidean distance to that
set. Alternatively, the elements of C can be interpreted as the positions of lobbies that reward
experts for producing information close to their positions. So the masquerading payoff of the
sender can be written as
v(s|t) = −d(s, t)− λ(t)d(s, C),
where λ(t) > 0. The term λ(t) captures the weight that the sender puts on the different
components of the masquerading payoff, and it can vary across types. It is easy to show that
the masquerade relation generated by these payoffs satisfies (WR). Indeed, we have
v(s|t) > v(t|t)⇔ λ(t)(d(t, C)− d(s, C)) > d(s, t)⇒ −d(s, C) > −d(t, C),
so we can use −d(·, C) as a weak representation of the masquerade relation. Hence, there is an
evidence base whenever each type is able to certify that she is at least as close to the set of social
stereotypes as she actually is. In that case, there exists a fully revealing equilibrium in which any
message is skeptically interpreted as stemming from a sender who is at the maximum distance
(consistent with the evidence contained in the message) from the set of social stereotypes.
The interpretation is interesting, as it implies that communication with evidence coupled with
skepticism on the side of the receiver mutes the effect of social stereotypes. 
In fact, the logic of this example can be generalized to any masquerading payoff that is the
sum of three terms, where one term is maximized when the sender masquerades as her true
type, the second term is proportional to a function of the type that she masquerades as, and
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the third term depends on the true type only.28
Proposition 4. Suppose that v(s|t) = f(s, t) + λ(t)g(s) + h(t), where f(·, t) admits a unique
maximum f(t, t), and λ(t) > 0. Then the masquerade relation associated to this masquerading
payoff is acyclic.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Biases. A more common approach is to think of experts as being biased. For that part,
we assume that T ⊆ RK . We assume that the masquerading payoff function takes the form
v(s|t) = −(s − t − b(t))′Ω(s − t − b(t)), where b : T → RK is a bias function, and Ω is a
symmetric positive semi-definite matrix. For example, if Ω is the identity matrix, then the
masquerading payoff is −||s− t− b(t)||2. A nice way to think of the bias function is to visualize
it as a vector field on RK such that, at each point t, the vector b(t) points to the direction
toward which t would like to masquerade. In fact, if t+ b(t) is in T , it is exactly the type that
t would prefer to masquerade as. We provide conditions on the bias function b(·) that ensure
acyclicity of the masquerade relation. One of the conditions is that the vector field b(t) (or a
straightforward transformation of it) can be obtained as the gradient of a potential function
φ(t).29 This condition is never sufficient and needs to be completed by an assumption on φ(·),
which can be interpreted as φ(·) not being too concave.
The reason why the potential from which b(·) derives should not be too concave can be
easily understood in a one dimensional example. For this, consider Figure 4. In Figure 4 (a),
b(·) derives from a convex potential, and as a consequence the vector field is centrifugal. Then
it is easy to be skeptical about any message: a worst case type for every compact subset S of R
is the point of S which is closest to the set of minimizers of φ(·). In Figure 4, (b) and (c), the
biases derive from a concave potential, and as a consequence the vector field is centripetal. Let
t∗ be the maximizer of the potential φ(·). Intuitively, centripetal biases may be problematic
because the types to the right of t∗ may want to pretend that they are to the left of t∗ and vice
28Note that the result of Proposition 4 also extends the observation made in Remark 2.
29A vector field that satisfies this property is called a conservative vector field, and when K = 3, this is
equivalent to having curl 0, that is, ∇× b(t) = 0.
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versa, creating cycles in the masquerade relation, as in Figure 4 (c). If the intensity of biases
tends to vanish for types close to t∗, however, these cycles will not be created. This is the case
when the potential function is not too concave, as in Figure 4 (b). The following proposition
shows that the same intuitions hold in the multidimensional case.
Proposition 5. Suppose that b(t) is continuously differentiable and satisfies, for every t,
Db(t) + I ≥ 0, where Db(t) is the Jacobian of b(t), and ≥ is in the sense of positive semi-
definite matrices. Suppose, in addition, that there exists a function φ : RK → R such that for
every t ∈ T , Ωb(t) = ∇φ(t). Then the masquerade relation is acyclic.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark 3. The sense in which the result requires the potential φ(·) to be not too concave is
the following: the Hessian of φ(·) is given by ΩDb(t), and we have Ω(Db(t) + I) ≥ 0 because Ω
and Db(t) + I are both positive semi definite. But Ω(Db(t) + I) is the Hessian of the function
ψ(t) = φ(t) + 1
2
t′Ωt, which must therefore be convex. So φ(·) is not too concave in the sense
that it must become convex when summed with the convex function 1
2
t′Ωt.
To illustrate Proposition 5, consider the easy case in which Ω = I and b(t) is the gradient
of the concave function −1
2
||t||2. Then Db(t) = −I and the conditions of the proposition hold.
In this case, the bias vector field b(t) is centripetal, with all the biases directed toward 0.
Another example is if b(t) is the gradient of the function φ(t) = 1
2
(α1t
2
1 − α2t22), where t ∈ R2,
α1, α2 ∈ R+, and t1 and t2 are the two dimensions of the type. Hence b(t) =
(
α1t1,−α2t2
)
.
Then, φ(t) has a saddle-point at 0 and the bias vector field b(t) is centrifugal on the first
dimension and centripetal on the second dimension, as illustrated in Figure 5. In this case, we
have Db(t) =
(
α1 0
0 −α2
)
, so Db(t) + I =
(
1+α1 0
0 1−α2
)
, and the conditions of the proposition are
satisfied whenever α2 ≤ 1.
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φ(t)
b(t)
T
(a)
φ(t)
b(t)
T
(b)
φ(t)
b(t)
T
(c)
φ(t)
b(t)
T
(d)
Figure 4: Illustration of Proposition 5 (biases) in the unidimensional case. The acyclic mas-
querade property is satisfied in parts (a), (b) and (d) because φ(t) + 1
2
t2 is convex, which is not
satisfied in part (c).
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Figure 5: The bias vector field with φ(t) = 1
2
(α1t
2
1 − α2t22).
Appendix
A Definitions
For clarity, we provide the precise definitions of several known concepts that play a role through-
out the paper. To formulate these definitions, consider two partially ordered sets (X,) and
(Y,).30
Definition 6 (Single-Peakedness). Suppose that X is linearly ordered. A function f : X → R
is single-peaked if f(x′) > f(x) implies f(x′′) > f(x) for every x′′ strictly between x and x′.
For the next three definitions, we adopt the terminology of Milgrom (2004).
Definition 7 (Single Crossing). A function f : X → R is single crossing if for every x  x′,
f(x) ≥ (>) 0 ⇒ f(x′) ≥ (>)0
Definition 8 (Increasing Differences). A function g : X × Y → R has increasing differences
if, for every x  x′ and y  y′, we have
g(x′, y)− g(x, y) ≤ g(x′, y′)− g(x, y′),
30When there is no risk of confusion, we use the same notation  for orderings defined on different sets.
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that is, if, for every x  x′, the difference function ∆(y) = g(x′, y)− g(x, y) is non-decreasing.
Definition 9 (Single Crossing Differences). A function g : X × Y → R has single crossing
differences in (x, y) if, for every x  x′, the difference function ∆(y) = g(x′, y) − g(x, y) is
single crossing.
Note that while the definition of increasing differences is symmetric, this is not the case for
the definition of single crossing differences.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 (Consistent Extremal Beliefs). Let σ be a fully revealing communication
strategy profile. Then each σi : Ti → ∆(Mi) is separating in the sense that, for every ti 6= t′i,
the supports of σi(ti) and σi(t
′
i) are disjoint. Let µi(t−i | m, ti) be the probability that player
i puts on t−i when she is of type ti and the message profile is m. Suppose that (σ, µ) forms a
fully revealing equilibrium with extremal beliefs.
Consider a sequence of mixed communication strategy profiles {σk}∞k=1, where σki (ti) ∈
∆(Mi(ti)) is completely mixed over Mi(ti), and such that each sequence σ
k
i (ti) converges to
σi(ti). Let µ
k
i (t−i | m, ti) be the beliefs computed from σki by Bayes rule:
µki (t−i | m, ti) =
σk−i(m−i|t−i)p(t−i|ti)∑
s−i∈T−i
σk−i(m−i|s−i)p(s−i|ti)
, (1)
where
σk−i(m−i|t−i) =
∏
j 6=i
σkj (mj|tj).
Consider an off the equilibrium path message profile m that follows a unilateral deviation
by player j. Then mj /∈ ∪tj∈Tj supp
(
σj(tj)
)
, whereas the message of each player i 6= j is such
that mi ∈ supp
(
σi(ti)
)
for some ti.
The strong belief consistency requirement implies that, for some sequence σk as the one
defined above, the associated beliefs µk converge to µ. Suppose that i is not the deviator, so
that i 6= j. The extremal belief assumption implies that µi(t−i | m, ti) = 1 for some t−i. But
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then, because the prior has full support, we deduce from (1) that, for every s−i 6= t−i,
lim
k→∞
σk−i(m−i|s−i)
σk−i(m−i|t−i)
= 0. (2)
Now consider the type profile s−i = (sj, t−ij), where sj 6= tj. By (2), we must have
lim
k→∞
σkj (mj|sj)
σkj (mj|tj)
= 0.
Note that the expression in the limit does not depend on i or on the messages of players other
than j. But then it implies that all non-deviators attribute the off the equilibrium path message
mj to the same type tj, regardless of the messages sent by m−j sent by players other than j
and regardless of their own type.
Proof of Theorem 1. First we show necessity. By Remark 1, the existence of a fully revealing
equilibrium implies (ii). To show that it implies (i), suppose that (i) does not hold. Then there
exists a message mi ∈ Mi such that wct
(
M−1i (mi)
)
= ∅. When receiving message mi from i,
the other players with extremal beliefs must assign it to some type in M−1i (mi), say si. But
since wct
(
M−1i (mi)
)
= ∅, there exists a type ti ∈ M−1i (mi) such that ti M−→ si. Then player i
would deviate from the equilibrium path by sending mi when she is of type ti, since that allows
her to masquerade as si.
Next, we show that (i) and (ii) together imply existence of a fully revealing equilibrium
with extremal beliefs. By (ii), there exists an evidence base Ei for Mi(·). Let ei : Ti → Ei
be the associated one-to-one mapping such that ti ∈ wct
(
M−1i (ei(ti))
)
. Then we contend
that, if (i) holds, there exists a fully revealing equilibrium with extremal beliefs in which the
communication strategy of player i is a pure strategy given by the mapping ei(·). To show
that, we now construct extremal beliefs that support this equilibrium. Consider a unilateral
deviation of player i of type ti who plays a message mi instead of ei(ti). If mi /∈ Ei, then
the deviation is detected, and can be prevented by the belief that the type of player i is some
si ∈ wct
(
M−1i (mi)
)
. Now suppose that mi ∈ Ei. Then the deviation cannot be detected by the
other players. But then it must be the case that mi = ei(si) for some si 6= ti. And the belief
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associated to mi is therefore the “on the equilibrium path” belief that i is of type si. Then, by
construction of ei(·), we have si ∈ wct
(
M−1i (mi)
)
, which means that such a deviation cannot
be beneficial for i.
To finish the proof, we show that the equilibrium we have constructed satisfies strong con-
sistency of beliefs. The equilibrium strategy is given by the profile e =
(
e1, . . . , en
)
. Let
t∗i (mi) ∈ M−1i (mi) be the equilibrium belief associated to any message mi /∈ Ei. Then
t∗i (mi) ∈ wct
(
M−1i (mi)
)
. Let N(ti) be the number of messages mi ∈ Mi(ti) \ Ei such that
ti = t
∗
i (mi).
Let σk be a sequence of completely mixed communication strategy profiles such that σki (·|ti)
puts probability 1−N(ti)
k
− |Mi(ti)|−N(ti)−1
k2
on the message ei(ti), probability 1/k on every message
mi ∈Mi(ti)\Ei, such that t∗i (mi) = ti, and probability 1/k2 on every remaining message. Hence
type ti puts more weight on messages for which she is a worst case type (1/k) than on other
messages she could send (1/k2). It is then easy to see that σk converges to e as k →∞.
Now consider the belief µki associated to the completely mixed strategy profile σ
k for each
player i. To check consistency, we need to check that the beliefs µki converge to the equilibrium
beliefs at two kinds of information set.
First consider an information set on the equilibrium path. That is, all the players have
observed a message profile m such that mi ∈ Ei for every i. Then
µki (t−i|m, ti) =
σk−i(m−i|t−i)p(t−i|ti)∑
s−i∈T−i
σk−i(m−i|s−i)p(s−i|ti)
, (3)
where
σk−i(m−i|t−i) =
∏
j 6=i
σkj (mj|tj),
converges to 1 if mj = ej(tj) for every j 6= i and to 0 otherwise. Hence, in the limit, µki (t−i|m, ti)
puts probability 1 on the vector e−1(m−i), which is indeed the belief that i forms about the
other players on the equilibrium path.
Next consider an information set that follows a detectable unilateral deviation. That is, all
the players but j have sent a message profile m−j ∈ E−j, whereas j has sent a message mj /∈ Ej.
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Then the belief formed by j about other players can be analyzed as we just did and satisfies
strong consistency. We need to show that this is true for other players as well, so consider a
player i 6= j. Her belief about other players is still given by (3). But now we have the following:
σk−i(m−i|t−i) =

O(1/k), if m` = e(t`) for every ` /∈ {i, j} and t∗j(mj) = tj
O(1/k2), if m` = e(t`) for every ` /∈ {i, j} and t∗j(mj) 6= tj
O(1/k2), otherwise.
In the last case, the k2 comes from the fact that at least one player other than i and j has
used a non-detectable deviation (probability 1/k), and j has used a message which she sends
with probability lower than 1/k. Therefore, µki (t−i|m, ti) must converge to a belief that puts
probability 1 on the unique profile t−i that satisfies t` = e−1` (m`) for ` /∈ {i, j}, and tj = t∗j(mj).
This is exactly the belief we used to construct our equilibrium, and this concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that
M−→ has a cycle t1i M−→ · · · M−→ tki M−→ t1i on Ti. Then
Si =
{
t1i , . . . t
k
i
}
does not have a worst case type. Now suppose that there exists Si ⊆ Ti such
that wct(Si) = ∅. Let s1i ∈ Si. Because wct(Si) = ∅ there exists s2i ∈ Si such that s2i M−→ s1i , but
there also exists s3i ∈ Si such that s3i M−→ s2i . If s3i = s1i , we have a cycle and we can conclude.
Otherwise, we can keep doing this until we obtain a cycle. This must happen eventually since
Si is finite. This shows the equivalence of (i) and (ii).
The equivalence between (i) and (iii) derives from Alcantud and Rodr´ıguez-Palmero (1999),
and the lower semi-continuity assumption on vi(si|ti). The function wi induces a complete,
transitive, and lower semi-continuous order on Ti defined by si  ti ⇔ wi(si) ≥ wi(ti), and by
(iii) it must be true that ti
M−→ si ⇒ si  ti. Hence (iii) implies (iv). It is easy to see that (iv)
implies that the masquerade relation is acyclic.
Proof of Theorem 2 (Interim Sufficient Conditions). For (MON), it is sufficient to note that
for ti 6= si, ti M−→ si implies by monotonicity that ti ≺ si. Hence a cycle in the masquerade
relation would also be a cycle for  on Ti, which would contradict its linearity. For the next
conditions, we start by noting that (ID) implies (SCD). Then we first show that (SCD) implies
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that
M−→ has no 2-cycle. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a 2-cycle t1i M−→ t2i M−→ t1i .
To fix ideas, suppose that t1i  t2i (we can do this because Ti is linearly ordered). Then we have
a contradiction with (SCD):
v
(
t2i |t1i
)− v(t1i |t1i ) > 0 > v(t2i |t2i )− v(t1i |t2i ),
where the two inequalities come from the masquerade relation. Now suppose that there exists
a longer cycle t1i
M−→ · · · M−→ tki M−→ t1i . Because Ti is linearly ordered, the set {t1i , . . . , tki } admits
a minimal element with respect to . To fix ideas, let t1i be that minimal element. Then we
have v
(
t2i |t1i
)−v(t1i |t1i ) > 0 and v(t1i |tki )−v(tki |tki ) > 0 from the fact that t1i M−→ t2i and tki M−→ t1i .
Since t1i is a minimal element in {t1i , . . . , tki }, we have t1i ≺ tki , and applying (SCD) to the first
of these two inequalities yields v
(
t2i |tki
)− v(t1i |tki ) > 0. Hence, we have
v
(
t2i |tki
)− v(tki |tki ) = v(t2i |tki )− v(t1i |tki )+ v(t1i |tki )− v(tki |tki ) > 0.
This inequality implies that t2i
M−→ · · · M−→ tki M−→ t2i forms a cycle of length k− 1. By doing this
over and over, we end up with a 2-cycle, which we already ruled out. To conclude, we have
shown that
M−→ is acyclic.
For (SP-NRM), note that the no reciprocal masquerade condition means that
M−→ has no
2-cycle. Let t1i
M−→ · · · M−→ tki M−→ t1i denote a longer cycle, k ≥ 3. We adopt the notation that
tk+1i = t
1
i . It must be the case that there exists ` /∈ {j, j + 1} such that tji ≺ t`i ≺ tj+1i or
tj+1i ≺ t`i ≺ tji . Indeed, otherwise we would have t1i ≺ t2i ≺ · · · ≺ tki ≺ t1i , a contradiction since
 is a linear order on Ti. Therefore, by single-peakedness, vi(tj+1i |tji ) > vi(tji |tji ) implies that
vi(t
`
i |tji ) > vi(tji |tji ), that is, tji M−→ t`i . Hence there exists a cycle without tj+1i ,
tji
M−→ t`i M−→ t`+1i M−→ · · · M−→ tj−1i M−→ tji ,
of length k′ < k. But then, by repeating this operation, we eventually obtain a 2-cycle, thus
contradicting the no reciprocal masquerade condition.
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Proof of Lemma 3 (Ex Post Sufficient Conditions).
(i) For every s′i  si, vi(s′i|ti; t−i) ≥ vi(si|ti; t−i) and the inequality is preserved by taking
expectations; hence vi(si|ti) satisfies (MON).
(ii) Suppose si ≺ ti. Then by ex post directional masquerade, vi(si|ti; t−i) ≤ vi(ti|ti; t−i), and
taking expectations, vi(si|ti) ≤ vi(ti|ti). Therefore, if vi(si|ti) > vi(ti|ti), it must be the case
that si  ti, which means that (DM) is satisfied.
(iii) Let ∆(ti; t−i) = vi(s′i|ti; t−i) − vi(si|ti; t−i), for s′i  si. Then ∆(·) is non-decreasing in ti.
But then ∆(ti) = E
(
∆(ti; t−i)|ti
)
= E
(
∆(ti; t−i)
)
by independence, and it is a non-decreasing
function of ti. Therefore, vi(si|ti) satisfies (ID).
Proof of Proposition 2. To avoid cumbersome notations, we write the proof in the case where
each action set Ai is one dimensional. The generalization to higher dimensions is straightforward
but heavy. With our assumptions, we can define the function vi(si|ti; t−i) on Θi × Θi × Θ−i,
and it is continuously differentiable. We show that this function has increasing differences in
(si, ti). It is well known that this is the case if ∂
2vi(si|ti, t−i)/∂si∂ti ≥ 0. The assumptions we
made ensure that every best-response satisfies the following first order condition
∂
∂ai
ui
(
BRi(a
∗
−i(si, t−i), t), a
∗
−i(si, t−i), t
)
= 0. (FOC)
Using the chain rule and (FOC) a first time, we have
∂
∂si
vi(si|ti; t−i) =
∑
j 6=i
∂
∂aj
ui
(
BRi(a
∗
−i(si, t−i), t), a
∗
−i(si, t−i), t
) ∂
∂si
a∗j(si, t−i),
and a second time,
∂2
∂si∂ti
vi(si|ti; t−i) =
∑
j 6=i
∂2
∂aj∂ti
ui
(
BRi(a
∗
−i(si, t−i), t), a
∗
−i(si, t−i), t
) ∂
∂si
a∗j(si, t−i).
The first term under the summation is nonnegative because ui(ai, a−i, t) has increasing differ-
ences in (a−i, ti); the second term is also nonnegative since the supermodularity of the base
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game implies that a∗(·) is non-decreasing.
Proof of Lemma 4. For any i ∈ C and t′i  ti, the difference
vi(si|t′i; t−i)− vi(si|ti; t−i) =
(
Ui(t
′
i, t−i)1Ui(t′i,t−i)>0 − Ui(ti, t−i)1Ui(ti,t−i)>0
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
1Si(si,t−i)≥q−1
+
(
Ui(t
′
i, t−i)1Ui(t′i,t−i)<0 − Ui(ti, t−i)1Ui(ti,t−i)<0
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
1Si(si,t−i)≥q
is non-decreasing in si since Si(si, t−i) is non-decreasing in si. For every i ∈ N\C and every
t′i  ti, the difference vi(si|t′i; t−i)− vi(si|ti; t−i) =
(
Ui(t
′
i, t−i)− Ui(ti, t−i)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
1Si(si,t−i)≥q is nonde-
creasing in si. Finally, under unanimity, the ex post masquerading payoff of a player i ∈ C is
vi(si|ti; t−i) = Ui(t)1Ui(t)>01S(si,t−i)≥C−1, which is nondecreasing in si.
Proof of Proposition 4. We have, for any s 6= t, v(s|t) > v(t|t) ⇔ g(s) − g(t) > 1
λ(t)
(
f(t, t) −
f(s, t)
) ⇒ g(s) > g(t), where the last implication follows from the fact that λ(t) > 0 and
f(t, t) > f(s, t). Therefore, the function g(·) is a weak representation for the masquerade
relation.
Proof of Proposition 5. We define the function ψ(t) = φ(t) + 1
2
t′Ωt. The function ψ(·) must be
convex, since Db(t) + I ≥ 0 implies that the Hessian of ψ(·) satisfies D2ψ = Ω (Db(t) + I) ≥ 0.
ψ(·) also inherits the continuous differentiability of φ(·). Then ∇ψ(t) satisfies the cyclical
monotonicity condition of Rockafellar (1972, p. 238). That is, for every finite sequence of
distinct types t(1), . . . , t(k), we have
k∑
`=1
(∇ψ(t(`)))′(t(`+ 1)− t(`)) ≤ 0,
with the convention that t(k + 1) = t(1). But that implies
k∑
`=1
b
(
t(`)
)′
Ω
(
t(`+ 1)− t(`))+ k∑
`=1
t(`)′Ω
(
t(`+ 1)− t(`))︸ ︷︷ ︸
T
≤ 0. (4)
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We can rewrite T as follows:
T =
k∑
`=1
t(`+ 1)′Ωt(`)−
k∑
`=1
t(`+ 1)′Ωt(`+ 1) = −
k∑
`=1
t(`+ 1)′Ω
(
t(`+ 1)− t(`)).
Then, combining the initial expression of T and the one we just derived, we can write that
T = 1
2
k∑
`=1
t(`)′Ω
(
t(`+ 1)− t(`))− 1
2
k∑
`=1
t(`+ 1)′Ω
(
t(`+ 1)− t(`))
= −1
2
k∑
`=1
(
t(`+ 1)− t(`))′Ω(t(`+ 1)− t(`))
Going back to (4), we now have:
k∑
`=1
b
(
t(`)
)′
Ω
(
t(`+ 1)− t(`))− 1
2
k∑
`=1
(
t(`+ 1)− t(`))′Ω(t(`+ 1)− t(`)) ≤ 0.
But that is exactly
k∑
`=1
(
v
(
t(`+ 1)|t(`))− v(t(`)|t(`))) ≤ 0.
And this rules out the possibility that t(1), . . . , t(k) forms a cycle of the masquerade relation,
as we would then have, for every ` = 1, . . . , k, v
(
t(`+1)|t(`))−v(t(`)|t(`)) > 0. Since the cyclical
monotonicity condition must hold for every finite sequence t(1), . . . , t(k), we have proved that
the masquerade relation must be acyclic.
C Identifying a Worst-Case Type
The following result identifies a worst case type under any condition of Theorem 2 and under
(DM).
Proposition 6. Suppose that vi(si|ti) satisfies (MON), (DM), (SP-NRM), or (SCD). Let Si
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be a compact subset of Ti and s
0
i = minSi. Then the sequence
sk+1i =

inf
{
ti ∈ Si | vi(ski |ti) > vi(ti|ti)
}
if
{
ti ∈ Si | vi(ski |ti) > vi(ti|ti)
} 6= ∅,
ski otherwise,
is non-decreasing and converges to some limit s∞i ∈ Si such that s∞i ∈ wct(Si).31
Proof. The result is obvious under (DM) and (MON) because in that case s∞i = s
0
i . Assume
(SCD). First notice that if sk+1i = s
k
i , then
{
ti ∈ Si | ti M−→ ski
}
= ∅, and hence ski ∈ wct(Si).
To show that the sequence is non-decreasing, we show that, if
{
ti ∈ Si | ti M−→ ski
} 6= ∅, then
sk+1i = inf
{
ti ∈ Si | ti M−→ ski
}
> ski . By way of contradiction, consider the smallest k such that
sk+1i < s
k
i (k ≥ 1 because s1i ≥ s0i ). Then, notice that sk+1i = sk−1i is impossible because (SCD)
implies (NRM). But sk+1i 6= sk−1i is also impossible because, in that case, we are in one of the
two following situations:
(i)
(Ti,)sk+1
i
sk−1
i
sk
iM
M
(ii)
(Ti,)sk−1
i
sk+1
i
sk
iM
M
In both situations, (SCD) implies sk+1i
M−→ sk−1i , a contradiction with ski = inf
{
ti ∈ Si | ti M−→
sk−1i
}
. A similar proof applies for (SP-NRM).
D The Coordination and Influence Games with Con-
stant Biases
The Coordination Game. In the coordination game of Example 3 with constant biases,
it is easy to show that every player i’s best-response takes the form BRi(a−i; t) = αii
(
θ(t) +
bi
)
+
∑
j 6=i αijaj, and that equilibrium actions under complete information are given by a
∗
i (t) =
31The same proposition is true by replacing s0i = minSi by s
0
i = maxSi and inf by sup.
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θ(t) +Bi for every i, with Bi ≡
∑
j∈N γijbj, γij ≡ βij αjj ∈ (0, 1) and the βij are the coefficients
of the matrix
β ≡

1 −α12 · · · −α1n
−α21 . . . . . . ...
... −αij . . . ...
−αn1 · · · · · · 1

−1
.
Next, we show that, for every player i such that
∑
j 6=i αij(Bi−Bj) ≥ 0, vi(si | ti; t−i) satisfies ex
post directional masquerade for the initial order on Ti vi(si | ti; t−i) > vi(ti | ti; t−i)⇒ si  ti. If
this is true, the interim masquerading payoff satisfies (DM) by Lemma 3, and for every message
mi, si = minM
−1
i (mi) is a worst case type of M
−1
i (mi). To see that it holds, observe that
vi(si | ti; t−i) > vi(ti | ti; t−i)
⇔ ui(BRi(a∗−i(si, t−i); ti, t−i), a∗−i(si, t−i); ti, t−i) > ui(a∗i (ti, t−i), a∗−i(ti, t−i), ti, t−i).
To simplify the notations, let s = (si, t−i) and t = (ti, t−i). Noting that player i’s utility when
she plays a best-response is given by a2i −
∑
j 6=i αija
2
j , the previous inequality becomes
[BRi(a
∗
−i(s); t)]
2 −∑j 6=i αij[a∗j(s)]2 > [a∗i (t)]2 −∑j 6=i αij[a∗j(t)]2. (5)
We use the form of player i’s best-response and of equilibrium actions to get BRi(a
∗
−i(s); t) =
αii
(
θ(t) + bi
)
+
∑
j 6=i αij
(
θ(s) + Bj
)
. From the fact that Bi = αiibi +
∑
j 6=i αijBj,
32 we get
BRi(a
∗
−i(s); t) = αiiθ(t) + (1 − αii)θ(s) + Bi. We insert this expression into Inequality (5) so
that:
vi(si | ti; t−i) > vi(ti | ti; t−i)
⇔ (θ(ti, t−i)− θ(si, t−i))[αii(1− αii)(θ(ti, t−i)− θ(si, t−i))+ 2∑j 6=i αij(Bi −Bj)] < 0.
If
∑
j 6=i αij(Bi −Bj) ≥ 0, then this inequality implies si  ti as θ(·) is non-decreasing.
32We know that a∗i (t) = θ(t) + Bi. From the expression of BRi(a
∗
−i(s); t) that we just calculated, we deduce
that Bi = αiibi +
∑
j 6=i αijBj since a
∗
i (t) = BRi(a
∗
−i(t); t).
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The same calculation shows that, for every player i such that
∑
j 6=i αij(Bi − Bj) ≤ 0,
vi(si | ti) > vi(ti | ti) ⇒ si ≺ ti. For every message mi of such players, si = maxM−1i (mi)
is a worst case type of M−1i (mi). Players for which
∑
j 6=i αij(Bi − Bj) is negative (positive,
respectively) are said to have a a relatively low (high, respectively) bias.
The Influence Game. In the influence game (Example 4) with constant biases, equilibrium
actions under complete information are given by a∗i (t) = θ(t) + bi for every i. We have:
vi(si | ti; t−i)− vi(ti | ti; t−i) =
(
θ(si, t−i)− θ(ti, t−i)
)∑
j 6=i
αij
[(
θ(ti, t−i)− θ(si, t−i)
)
+ 2(bi− bj)
]
.
Hence, when bi >
∑
j 6=i αijbj∑
j 6=i αij
, vi(si | ti, t−i) − vi(ti | ti, t−i) > 0 implies si  ti, and when
bi <
∑
j 6=i αijbj∑
j 6=i αij
, vi(si | ti, t−i) − vi(ti | ti, t−i) > 0 implies si ≺ ti. Therefore, in this example,
player i is said to have a relatively high (low, respectively) bias when bi −
∑
j 6=i αijbj∑
j 6=i αij
is positive
(negative, respectively).
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